Very few choices for the fighter for democracy

This surprises none in Myanmar anymore. On the 25th anniversary of the National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi had a piece of advice for civil society groups, when she asked them for greater collaboration with the military to promote national reconciliation. The 68-year old democracy icon and Nobel laureate lamented that civilian groups are not in touch with the Tatmadaw (the army in Myanmar) and described it as a "big challenge for me and the whole country". Without dealing with the Tatmadaw, she doubted whether the process of "national reconciliation" would go forward.

The Tatmadaw still has huge control over areas populated by ethnic minorities because these are treated as regions where the 'national security' of the Union of Myanmar is threatened. Unless the army agrees to open dialogue with the ethnic rebel groups or organizations representing the ethnic minorities, there is no way the process of reconciliation can go forward. Mrs Suu Kyi is in opposition and not in government, which is run by a former general. That is the ground reality.

Analysts say Suu Kyi has a point and she is perhaps getting realistic. A recent book authored by Renaud Egreteau and Larry Jagan, Soldiers and Diplomacy in Burma, has detailed the formidable dominance of the Myanmar army and argued that it still has all the wherewithal to maintain its praetorian influence on the country, including its political system and foreign policy. The book is a must read for anyone seeking insight into contemporary Myanmar not only because it has been painstakingly researched over a long period but also because of its documentation. Its conclusion: the army still controls much of what happens in Myanmar and the process of phased and limited democratization is controlled by the army, albeit from the background.

The constitution reserves 25 per cent of parliament seats for soldiers, and three key ministries — defence, foreign affairs and border areas — must be headed by men in uniform. And the law that bars local people from contesting for presidency if they are married to foreigners remains in place. Which means Aung San Suu Kyi can never contest for presidency, although her husband, Michael Aris, a former Oxford professor, is long dead and gone. Or should we say she can contest the polls only if the army agrees to change the law and allow local persons married to foreigners to contest polls, including for the position of the president. So this is another ground reality — Aung San Suu Kyi cannot run for president unless the army agrees to change the law and the military-backed Thein Sein government agrees to introduce it in parliament and pass it.

No wonder, during the 25th anniversary of the NLD, Suu Kyi reiterated calls for constitutional change before the upcoming 2015 election. "If we do not change the Constitution, we cannot say our country is really a democracy," she told those gathered at the ceremony. And she promptly warned: "If we hold an election with an unfair Constitution, the result will also be unfair."

But the question that many will ask is whether the constitution can be changed now. The NLD, in spite of its clean sweep of the by-elections, only has 43 seats in parliament, which at best leaves its lawmakers as a strong opposition block, but not with the kind of numbers needed for constitutional change. Going by her present mood, Suu Kyi is unwilling to start a mass agitation to push the ruling Thein Sein government on constitutional changes. After so many years under house arrest, she cannot risk another confrontation with the Tatmadaw, which retains all the levers of power, in spite of the civilian façade, which has actually helped it gain legitimacy and provided it with options to balance the Chinese stranglehold on the country by opening up to the West. Suu Kyi's only real option is to engage the Tatmadaw and negotiate some constitutional changes that would give her a chance to be president, that she says she wants to be.

Once that happens, Aung San Suu Kyi loses out on her traditionally strongest support base — the West. This became evident from the great White House welcome that President Thein Sein received during his recent visit to the United States of America — and in spite of strong opposition from Congressmen who resent getting too close to a government still led by soldiers with a brutal track record on human rights and much else. Myanmar's men in uniform still control all the levers of power and the democratic process is more aimed at 'managing the world' — if needed by engaging with Aung San Suu Kyi without giving her much leverage — than giving the Myanmar people a real voice .

Egreteau and Jagan also warn against 'Great Game' allusions that argues for Myanmar as a "morphed battlefield" between China and the West with the US mobilizing other powers like India and Japan to balance the Dragon. They argue, perhaps rightly, that the Tatmadaw, which panders to xenophobic nationalism, has only played its geo-political card well to balance the contending powers. The Tatmadaw's opening out to the West, that lay behind the limited democratization process, was also aimed at playing on its China fears, to ensure that the West focuses on engaging Myanmar rather than on making Myanmar an 'authentic democracy' its priority.

The India-China rivalry in Myanmar is also overplayed by Western and Indian academics, although not by Jagan and Egreteau. During Manmohan Singh's visit to China in October, the two countries decided to take forward the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar concept and develop the BCIM economic corridor. A Chinese commentator said the BCIM could become a "game changer" in Asia, because it not only has the potential to create "greater economic linkages" between the two most populous nations which have become the second and the third largest economies in the world.

Now Myanmar and Bangladesh are both crucial to the success of the BCIM and India and China are seeking cooperation rather than competition or conflict between these two neighbouring countries. Without Bangladesh and Myanmar, India and China's border regions cannot really link up and the proposed economic corridor cannot materialize. China appears more keen than India to push the BCIM economic corridor not just for reasons of trade and investment but also to draw India firmly into its ambit of 'trusted friends' that will not rise to the US bait for a 'contain China move'. No wonder the two nations declared Kunming and Calcutta sister cities during Manmohan Singh's Beijing visit. Much is expected from the November 21-22 K2K summit due in Calcutta this year.

Kunming is Yunnan's capital and Yunnan is China's 'bridgehead province' with borders with several Southeast Asian countries. Calcutta is eastern India's biggest city and the Chinese see it as the other end of the BCIM continuum. But the BCIM friendship to connect Kunming with Calcutta will run through Bangladesh and Myanmar. Geography demands that if India and China are out to play a new game based on Li Keqiang's "handshake across the Himalayas", Bangladesh and Myanmar are to be part of it. There is also a growing realization in Delhi that the China-built infrastructure in both these countries can be gainfully used by India to access its own northeastern region in pursuit of its 'Look East policy'. And China's desperate search for land-to-sea access is more to avoid the Malacca chokepoint than to throw a 'string of pearls' around India — something the US-inspired academia and media are keen to promote.

So in Bangladesh, Indian diplomats are now saying they are not on the 'same page' with the US because the latter is backing the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, while the Awami League remains India's preferred friend which has delivered on Delhi's key concerns like security. The Indian and US diplomats have been involved recently in a bitter spat with India's objecting to the open advocacy of the US envoy, Dan Mozena, for the BNP. A senior Indian diplomat told me in Dhaka recently that they find the Chinese role of getting the two battling begums, Hasina and Khaleda, to speak "much more constructive". Because that is what India also wants — a settlement on how to conduct the polls followed by an inclusive and peaceful election, rather than endless street protests which will only strengthen the Islamist radicals.

The equations can also change in Myanmar, if India responds enthusiastically to the BCIM economic corridor plans because without it, Delhi's 'Look East' has little chance of taking off. China has already said its 'bridgehead' out of Yunnan converges with, rather than contradicts, India's 'Look East'. So in Myanmar, Suu Kyi may find herself left with none of the big players backing her against the army any more — for different reasons though. Her only option — reconciliation with the Tatmadaw.

http://www.information.myanmaronlinecentre.com/very-few-choices-for-the-fighter-for-democracy/